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1. A Sudden Crisis of Trust

At the turn of the century, levels of political trust in the Netherlands were at an all time high. In 1998, a full two thirds of the population thought the government was functioning well, and a staggering 80 per cent was satisfied or very satisfied with the performance of the cabinet – percentages rivalling those of North Korea or Cuba. Suddenly, however, from 2002 onwards, public trust in government started to deteriorate. By 2004, only a third of the population still thought the government was functioning well and only 49% was satisfied with the cabinet.

This abrupt and rapid decline in political trust was perceived with alarm. Many politicians, commentators and social scientists worried about the sudden loss of trust, as trust scores are often viewed as a litmus test of how well government is doing in the eyes of the citizens. Ever since Almond and Verba’s (1963) Civic Culture, support for the democratic regime has been assumed to be an essential element in democratic politics. Dissatisfaction with the institutional arrangements is expected to affect their legitimacy and stability in the long run (Easton 1965). Disenchantment, distrust and cynicism—in one word dissatisfaction—are assumed to contribute to political alienation (Citrin 1974) and to undermine the very essence of democracy.

The Netherlands is not the only Western democracy to experience such a sudden decline in political trust. Other western democracies, such as Belgium in the wake of the Dutroux affaire and the White marches in the mid 1990s, or Germany after the fall of the wall and the reunification of West and East Germany, have also witnessed similar collapses in political trust within relatively short periods of time. Steep declines were also documented in Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1990s (Van de Walle et al. 2008: 54). 

This chapter aims to shed more light on the reasons for such extraordinary drops in trust levels by studying the case of the Netherlands. The Netherlands is an otherwise very stable and established democracy, and representative for similar Western European political systems. We will show that sudden declines are part of short-term trends in which trust orientations fluctuate. Abrupt losses of trust are short-run temporary dips, rather than part of long-run structural declines that are harmful to the working of government. 

Looking at the current situation in The Netherlands, what do we see? Is political trust in The Netherlands withering away, or is it merely wavering? Has the abrupt loss in trust turned into a structural decline or was it a temporary dip? And how do the Dutch findings relate to international time series data on political trust in Europe? Secondly, how is a sudden drop or decline to be explained? Building on the distinction between structural factors that explain long-term changes and shorter- term factors, we argue that structural changes in society, the media, and government, have created the conditions for an increased volatility in political trust. But first, we will discuss various objects of political trust and how trust is measured.


2. What is Political Trust?

Although many theories assume that democracy cannot work without trust, there appears to be little consensus on how this should be defined and measured. Despite the important function that is attached to it in democratic politics, political trust remains a “fuzzy” concept. It is one of those concepts that everybody has a sense of what it means, but of which no widely accepted definition has been given (Hardin 1999). 

Trust in What? 
First of all, it should be established that there are various objects of political trust. Should we see trust as generalized, as something not well specified (referring to a system or a principle)? Or must political trust necessarily refer to a particular person, such as a politician, the set of politicians, to an institution, such as the government, or an outcome, such as government policy?

For example, trust in government, where government is understood to refer to public administration or the public sector, should be distinguished from trust in the cabinet or the national government. The former – called ‘overheid’ in Dutch – is the conglomerate of hundreds of public institutions, ranging from local councils, independent regulatory authorities and executive bodies, to government departments. The cabinet or the national government – ‘regering’ in Dutch - on the other hand, is comprised of two or three coalition parties and a few dozen ministers and junior ministers. The perceptions citizens have of these two institutions need not coincide, or even be related - it is one thing to have little trust in the incumbent cabinet, but quite another to be dissatisfied with the performance of the public administration in general or with specific public services (Van de Walle 2004).

Some surveys ask about trust in parliament or in political parties, which are very specific institutions within the political system. Others, such as the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) measure attitudes towards politicians, and in doing so, may or may not differentiate between members of parliament and members of the cabinet. Finally, there are surveys that focus more on a regime level, on trust in the democracy. The Commission’s Eurobarometer, launched in the early 1970s, includes a question on the level of satisfaction with democracy—a question often drawn on as an indicator for measuring trust in government, although it is not clear whether this indicator measures support on a specific or on a regime level of the system (Canache et al 2001; Karp et al. 2001; Van de Walle et al 2008). 

In media reports about the decline of trust, these various institutions and actors are often lumped together. Low trust in the cabinet is sometimes equated with a decline of trust in government, in the sense of the whole public sector, or even with a decline in support for democracy. However, these are to be valued quite differently. Low trust figures for the cabinet can, in fact, be interpreted as a sign of a well-functioning democracy. They will be a matter of serious concern for the prime minister and his spin doctors, but need not disturb others beyond the inner circle of the current cabinet and the coalition members. Low levels of satisfaction with democracy, on the other hand, suggests a more systemic malaise and should be a major concern for all democratic minded citizens. These differences in object of trust are based on Easton’s (1965) influential distinction between diffuse support (for the system and the regime) and specific support (i.e. support for the incumbent authorities, that is, the current political leaders and their policies). Easton believed that attitudes towards these objects have significantly different political consequences.​[1]​ 

Some trust measures have been faulted for their references to unclear objects (political leaders, institutions, regime) or performance (Citrin & Muste 1999; Levi & Stoker 2000; Cook & Crunke 2005). One of the problems is that, when asked in survey questions, these distinctions may have little meaning to many ordinary citizens, for whom politics is a remote world of little interest and who are not familiar with the subtle, but constitutionally very relevant distinctions between various political actors and institutions (Citrin & Muste 1999: 468). For example, less educated respondents in The Netherlands tend not to distinguish between members of parliament or the cabinet.​[2]​

What is Trust? 
More complicated is the question of what the meaning is of trust and how it can be measured. There are many competing and unclear definitions of political trust and there is little agreement on its precise meaning. Most researchers on trust have wrestled with this abundance of concepts and indicators (Citrin & Muste 1999; Levi & Stoker 2000). Much of the empirical work on political trust—usually based on survey results—does not proceed from any clear account of what is meant by political trust in the first place. “Rather, trust is taken to be what is measured by one or more survey questions” (Nannested 2008: 415). 

Does political trust refer to the faith people have in their government (Citrin & Muste 1999)? Or does political trust mirror citizens’ evaluations as to whether or not political authorities and institutions are performing in accordance with expectations held by the public (Miller & Listhaug 1990: 358; Hetherington 2005: 9)? Scholars like Uslaner (2002) see trust as norm driven, as a moral worldview that develops during early socialization. Trust is then deeply ingrained and difficult to change. Others, like Hardin (2002), depict trust as a rational (instrumental) concern, a set of interests existing between individuals that develop through life. Trust in this view is easily altered by new social or political conditions. 

Empirical research on political trust relies for the most part on surveys. But few survey studies ask their respondents directly to indicate their levels of political trust. People are asked about their confidence, their satisfaction, their opinions and their affective orientations towards government or for an instrumental evaluation of these objects. This gap between the conceptual and the empirical realm makes it sometimes very difficult to theorize on the basis of these empirical results (Nannested 2008). In The Netherlands, for example, the Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) asks respondents whether they think the government ‘functions well’ and whether they ‘are satisfied’ with the incumbent cabinet. In the Eurobarometer surveys, on the other hand, respondents are explicitly asked whether they ‘tend to trust’ specific institutions, such as the cabinet, parliament or political parties. 


3. Political Trust in the Netherlands: Wavering or Withering?

What is the state of play regarding political trust in the Low Countries? There seems to be a general belief that trust levels regarding all political institutions and actors are low and in a permanent state of decline (Hendriks 2006; 2009; Korsten & De Goede 2006). Media reports, invariably, are ominous. Many media reports tend to be biased, however – only downward fluctuations are reported, upward movements never make it to the headlines – or they are based on non recurrent single measurements, markedly suggestive polls, or selective reporting. 

In order to gain more insight into questions of change in political trust, a time series analysis of longitudinal data is required. Decades of responses to the same survey questions are needed to provide a basis to assess variation across time. This is not easy, as not all studies always ask the same or similar (or equivalent) questions; or surveys have not included the same question over an extended period of time. For the longitudinal analysis of these trust trends over time which is needed to answer the question of whether political trust is withering or merely wavering, the choice of data is remarkably restricted (Hay 2007; Hetherington & Rudolph 2008; Van de Walle et al. 2008). Using the sparse data available we will, nonetheless, attempt to trace the trends. 

Every two years, usually in the fall, the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) issues a major survey on social, political and cultural trends and attitudes in The Netherlands. The survey monitors, among other things, levels of satisfaction with the cabinet (‘regering’) and the performance of the government (‘overheid’). The results are pictured in figure 1. According to the data of the SCP, the evaluation of cabinet performance, and government in general, improved steadily in the nineties. In 1998, 80% of all respondents reported being satisfied or very satisfied with the cabinet and two thirds of the respondents thought the Dutch government was doing a good job. These numbers remained stable through the year 2000. However, by the end of 2002, the number of respondents who indicated that government was doing a good job had plummeted to less than a third of the population. This decline continued until 2004. Likewise, the number of respondents that was satisfied with the cabinet dropped to under 50 per cent in 2004. The swiftness and relentlessness with which public trust in government evaporated was especially striking. Yet in 2006, trust figures were on the rise again, as can be seen in Figure 1. According to the fall 2008 SCP survey, cabinet and government satisfaction ratings had returned to their 1995 levels.





These findings were corroborated by the Belevingsmonitor Rijksoverheid; a trimonthly survey initiated in 2003 by the cabinet in response to the growing concern about the widely publicised decreasing trust figures. This government monitor mercilessly registered the ongoing decline in trust in the cabinet. At the time of the first survey, in early 2003, about half of the respondents still had trust in the cabinet. This soon fell to about a third, where it remained for several years.​[3]​ In 2007, the cabinet, frustrated by its low marks, decided to discontinue the monitor - prematurely, as it proved: by September 2006, the downward trend had started to reverse as the monitor registered an upturn in trust in the cabinet. In March 2008, the SCP started its own quarterly survey, the Continue Onderzoek Burgerperspectieven (COB) as a successor to the Belevingsmonitor. The combined data from both surveys show how trust in the cabinet recovered after the steep decline at the beginning of the century (figure 2).





Another set of comparable, longitudinal data is provided by the Eurobarometer, which is conducted twice yearly in April and November. In most, but not all of these twice- yearly surveys, respondents are asked about their trust in a series of institutions.​[4]​ The Eurobarometer data show a rather similar pattern of decline and recovery of trust in the major political institutions in the Netherlands, as can be seen from Figure 3.


Figure 3: Trust in cabinet, political parties and parliament in The Netherlands 1997-2009 (Source: Eurobarometer).​[5]​


Figure 3 shows how trust in cabinet (‘national government’) and parliament steeply declined, beginning in April 2002. Trust levels remained low throughout 2005. As with the other surveys, trust figures started to recover from early 2006. At the start of the new Balkenende-Bos cabinet, in April 2007, trust in the cabinet even peaked beyond the extraordinary high scores of the turn of the century. Trust figures then wavered again, as the financial crisis acutely manifested itself. 

The Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES), conducted around each parliamentary election since 1977, measures the level of cynicism toward politicians and political parties. The Eurobarometer data show that political parties are trusted less than cabinet or parliament (see figure 3). The DPES survey, in which respondents are asked whether they agree with a series of negative statements about politicians and political parties, allows us to investigate whether negative sentiment towards politics has grown (figure 4). Remarkably, no sharp increase in political cynicism can be discerned. At the elections of 2006, negative sentiment toward politicians and members of Parliament was at roughly the same levels as in the seventies and eighties, or even lower. The only exception regarded the statement ‘politicians promise more than they can deliver’. However, the number of respondents agreeing with this statement -arguably indicative of a politically mature rather than a cynical attitude - had already started to rise in the eighties and nineties.






Both the Eurobarometer and the DPES surveys also provide longitudinal data about attitudes towards democracy. Time series data on satisfaction with democracy in the Netherlands drawn from the Eurobarometer show similar patterns as those from the other institutions. Satisfaction with democracy reached an all time high of 90% around the turn of the century. A steep decline followed in the years 2002 and 2003, the lowest point of which nonetheless was still higher than the peaks of the eighties. It was followed by a gradual recovery from 2004 onwards. In recent years, satisfaction with democracy has returned to the levels of the nineties.​[6]​ As can be observed from figure 5, the overall trend tends to be positive. Over the past decades, an increasing number of respondents report satisfaction with the way democracy functions. 





On the basis of these longitudinal data, a number of observations can be made about the development of political trust in The Netherlands. 

Trust is wavering, but not withering
Despite the widely held view that trust in Dutch government and politics is in a long-term (and irreversible) decline, there is little actual evidence of this:
	After a strong dip at the start of the century, trust in the government had returned to the high levels of the nineties by 2008. There is no evidence for a permanent decline.
	The strong dissatisfaction with the cabinet, that manifested itself between 2002 and 2004, was not structural. Satisfaction increased markedly in 2007, with levels overtaking even the high of the late nineties. However, vigorous fluctuations are also seen. 
	Trust in Parliament follows a similar pattern – after a dip in 2003, this reverted to the level of the nineties.
	Political parties tend to be trusted less than cabinet or parliament, but the fluctuations in trust levels tend to follow similar patterns.
	There are no indications that the cynicism about politicians has risen. Negative attitudes about politicians have remained stable in the past three decades.
	Satisfaction with democracy is very high. In 2008, around 80% of the respondents was (very) satisfied with the way democracy functions in The Netherlands. Despite a strong dip around 2003, the long-term trend is positive. 
Trust in Dutch political institutions is in flux, but not in decline.​[7]​ The Netherlands is not exceptional in this respect. Trust levels have been moving both up and down since the mid 1970s in many other countries as well (Levi & Stokes 2000: 483; Hay 2007; Van de Walle 2008). In fact, most time series show that trust has been in flux since the early mid 1970 and early 1980s.

The Netherlands remains a high trust country
In the heat of the public debate, following the sharp decline of trust, it was suggested that The Netherlands has turned into a low trust country, on a par with countries like Belgium or France. There is no evidence to substantiate this view. Figure 6 compares the trust in cabinets in The Netherlands with that in those in the rest of the EU. 






Figure 6 shows that, on average, all EU member states suffered from a decline in trust in their national government after 9/11 and recovered after 2006. However, although the dip was much deeper in The Netherlands, the trust figures in The Netherlands remained (far) above the EU average all throughout the dip. 

There are stark contrasts in levels of political trust among the EU member states. Salient results from the Eurobarometer are the persistently low satisfaction levels in Italy or Greece. The general trend in Denmark, Luxembourg, Ireland and The Netherlands, on the other hand, has been one of increasing levels of satisfaction with democracy, while other countries show dips and peaks, suggesting volatility (Norris 2009). Again, we see that the overall pattern in the EU is that of trendless fluctuations, rather than a steady erosion of trust (Van de Walle et al. 2008; Norris 2009). There is no evidence that EU democracies have consistently experienced falling public satisfaction or that there are any steady trends across European democracies. Similar observations have been made about the United States (Levi and Stoker 2000; Hay 2007: 28; Van de Walle et al. 2008).  

Trust is Generic and Non-specific 
Another observation is that the trust patterns analysed for various political institutions are remarkably alike, albeit at different levels. All political institutions in The Netherlands experienced an all time high around the turn of the century, a steep decline in 2002-2004 and a gradual, but volatile recovery from 2006 onwards. People seem to express a generic satisfaction or dissatisfaction with political institutions (Stimson 2004: 154). There is a very strong individual-level connection between how citizens evaluate the government or the performance of the cabinet and how they evaluate the parliament or the quality of democracy in The Netherlands, a finding that is demonstrated in comparable ways in other countries (Levi & Stoker 2000: 483; Cook & Gronke 2005). The rate and timing of the fluctuations of the different trust measures within a country are remarkably similar. These findings raise doubts about the possibility, theoretically or empirically, of distinguishing between different kinds of “specific support”. People’s trust in political institutions is of a general character: a high level of trust in one institution tends to extend to other institutions, as well (Christensen & Laegreid 2002). 

This joint approval and disapproval of both parliament/congress and government/ cabinet indicates that the evaluations of legislative and executive branches are hard to pull apart and distinguish, because they are quite obviously measuring the same thing. As Stimson points out: “What we are observing is generic approval and trust, a spirit that moves up and down over time and seems to respond to generalized satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the state of things” (Stimson 2004: 154).


4. Explaining the Flux

How are we to understand the movements in political trust in the Netherlands, but also in other parts of the EU and elsewhere? Most common explanations on the decline in trust perceive this as cross-national gradual erosion of political support over a relatively long-term within advanced industrial democracies (Norris 1999; Pharr & Putnam 2000; Dalton 2004: 81-83). Consequently, they tend to focus on long-term, often socio-demographic, explanatory variables, such as secularization, generational replacement, or the rise of post-materialism. 

We have shown that trust in The Netherlands is in flux. Sudden dips – and consequent recoveries - in public trust cannot be explained by long-term demographic, social and political changes. To understand short-term fluctuations, we require an additional and more dynamic set of factors that are able to make sense of periods of increases and consequential decreases in political trust. 

Fluctuations in trust can be understood as resulting from a combination of long-term changes and short-term performances. Building on the distinction between structural factors that explain long-term changes on the one hand, and shorter-term factors on the other, we argue that structural changes in society, the media, and government, have created the conditions for political trust to become more volatile. The presence of specific short-term factors explains the dynamics in the movements of trust. Table 1 displays the factors that are relevant for understanding the fluctuations in political trust. 

Table 1:Short- and long-term explanations for the Flux in Political Trust
Structural changes that have made political trust more volatile	Sources of short-term political trust fluctuations:
Changes in society & citizensChanges in governmentChanges in the media	Shifts in Consumer Confidence Shifts in Political Process (International) Crises


Long-Term Changes: Conditions for Volatility  
One of the structural conditions that have made levels of trust in political institutions more unstable or variable is that citizens are better informed than in the past. Citizens know more about political leaders, what they do, and how they fail. People have become more attentive to public life and a growing body of evidence indicates that informed and interested people make decisions differently compared to those who are uninformed (Zaller 1992). Moreover, many citizens no longer associate themselves with political parties and are likely to change party allegiances from one election to another (Drummond 2006). Not only has voting behaviour become more volatile, public opinion, too, has become erratically moody. 

Although there is a tendency in the literature to explain the changing trust levels by changes in what Hay (2007) has called demand side factors (rising expectations, more information, changed values), there are also a range of supply-side factors—changes in the ‘substantive’ content of the goods that governments and politics deliver to consumers/citizens—that have changed the relationship between government and citizens and can help to explain why trust has become more volatile.

Several governments have taken significant steps to respond to demands for better services, more responsive policy development, and more accountable government structures. Reforms in government have created standards by which governments can be measured in terms of results and outcomes (Rosanvallon 2008). Also, at the political level the idea has evolved that politicians can now be held accountable for their performance and for keeping their promises. 

Globalization and the explosion of the information age, on the other hand, have dramatically changed the nature of governance around the world (Zussman 1997). The opening of national borders through globalization has made it increasingly difficult for national governments to develop policies relating solely to the domestic market. Government’s perceived (in)ability to respond effectively to persistent problems such as economic crises and climate change cause citizens to question government’s ability to solve these problems effectively (Hay 2007). A trend towards more volatility in trust levels may well be a consequence of the newly emerging governance landscape. 

Finally, the role of the media in the fickleness of political trust should not be underestimated. The media choose, select, and interpret what we see of our government and politicians. Live television has helped to turn a significant part of the political process into a public spectacle. The media approach is driven in large numbers by stories that portray conflict and controversy, and journalists are often rewarded on the basis of these criteria (Zussman 1997: 250). These stories attract viewers, sell newspapers and impact heavily on the views of citizens, who follow the political process from a distance. (Newton  2006)

In the age of TV and Internet, political communication can become a critical part of  trust building and trust loss. The rapid development of the Internet has afforded governments and state watch organizations the ability to provide more information on public services and to move their activities closer to citizens. Twitter, e-mail, internet, text messages, weblogs—these new information technologies have in fact contributed to many of the decentralizing and democratizing tendencies that we witnessed over the past few years. These media have opened up the access to information and made the way into traditionally closed up government easier. 

These structural changes may have created the conditions for rapid fluctuations in political trust to occur. We will discuss three short-term factors that help to explain the swift movements in public opinion. 

 Short-term Performances: Explaining the Movements 
Three sources appear to be important determinants for the fluctuations in political trust: consumer confidence, political processes and the upsurge of dramatic events or (international) crisis. In The Netherlands, the temporal dip in political trust between 2002 and, roughly, 2006 draws for an explanation on a combination of these three factors (Bovens & Wille 2008). But in the EU and the US, too, these three are key.

First and foremost, fluctuations in political trust over time are related strongly to movements in consumer confidence (Van de Walle 2004; Tiemeijer 2006; Van der Meer & Dekker 2009). For example, the rise and fall of support for the EU can be linked to the economy (Hix 2008). Hix calls this the “fair-weather-phenomenon”: citizens like government when the economy is booming and dislike government when the economy is declining—because they blame the government for the lack of success. A strong link between political trust and the economy also appears to exist in the US (Hetherington 2005; Hetherington & Rudolph 2008). Trust declined through the 1970s, a decade characterized by declining real income, high unemployment, and skyrocketing inflation. Trust then increased with the economic resurgence of the middle Reagan years, only to decline again in the early 1990s during a recession. During the long, uninterrupted economic recovery under Bill Clinton, trust in government rebounded, despite the president’s persistent and intense scandal problems. 

Similarly, the rise and fall of trust in political institutions and democracy in The Netherlands is also strongly correlated to the patterns in citizen’s perception of the state of the economy, as can be seen by comparing the patterns in reported satisfaction with democracy with the ups and downs in the reported levels of consumer confidence (figure 7). 





These long-term trust figures display very similar fluctuations, with political trust following the pattern of economic trust with a delay of one or two years. The lowest levels of satisfaction with democracy were reported during the recession of the early 1980s, when consumer confidence was at its lowest in the past three decades. During the economic boom of the 1990s, satisfaction with democracy rose to an all-time high, but dropped abruptly after the Internet bubble burst at the turn of the century. When the economy recovered, from 2003 onwards, satisfaction rose steeply, until it dropped again after the financial crisis started to manifest itself from the fall of 2007 onwards. 

Evidently, the bottom line is that when citizens are confident about their economic situation, their satisfaction with government increases. This also goes a long way towards explaining why all EU member states, on average, experienced similar patterns in decline and increase of trust in their national governments between 2001 and 2008 (see figure 6). To a certain extent, they all suffered from an economic decline after the Internet bubble evaporated at the turn of the century. What remains to be explained is why the dip after 2001 was much so deeper in The Netherlands than elsewhere.

Another factor affecting the fluctuations in the trust-in-government levels is the perception of political processes and of political institutions. Citizens are often relatively satisfied with the performance of specific public services, yet express scepticism about the public sector when asked about its performance in general or in abstract terms (Bouckaert & Van de Walle 2003). The opinion of citizens about government in general (i.e. public administration), tends to be determined by more general social or political sentiments (Van de Walle 2004: 219-220). Americans like democracy in theory, but are troubled by it in practice, disliking the sometimes bitter partisan disagreement inherent in the legislative process (Mutz & Reeves 2005). Congress is unpopular relative to the presidency and judiciary because its processes are so public (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). Congressional approval, a barometer of both performance- and process-related concerns, is a key determinant of political trust (Hetherington 1998).

The evaluation of political processes also determined popular support for the EU in the last decade. Citizens started to notice that the EU has become far more than simply an economic union (Hix 2008: 53-54); when EU meetings and decisions became more prominent on TV news and newspapers and politics in the EU became more publicly visible in the last decade, not surprisingly, then “the anti-Europe bottle had been uncorked” (Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994)). 

In the Netherlands, public opinion on politics and the cabinet turned increasingly more negative in the fall of 2002. Dissatisfaction with the incumbent, short-lived, right wing Balkenende cabinet and its policies partly explained why trust plummeted so steeply in the Netherlands, which served to fuel the Dutch dip (Bovens & Wille 2008).

Finally, (international) crises and dramatic events are important for understanding the short-term dynamics of political trust. The emergence of (international) crises can affect trust in the short run. Sudden international crises, such as 9/11 or the banking crisis of October 2008, can rally the public around the flag and cause trust levels to rise temporarily (Hetherington & Rudolph 2008; Mueller 1970;Chanley 2002). “During a crisis, people are more inclined to think collectively because only government can respond to the threat” (Hetherington & Rudolph 2008: 501). This explains the dramatic surge in trust in the fall of 2001, in the wake of 9/11 in the US, and to a lesser extent in the Netherlands and the rest of the EU (see figure 6). 

Similarly, in November 2008, after Wouter Bos, the Dutch minister of Finance, bailed out a number of major Dutch banks and averted the collapse of the financial sector, trust in the Dutch cabinet showed a sudden peak, despite the declining confidence in the economy, as can be seen from figure 3 and figure 8. In the spring of 2009, the rally around the flag was over, and political trust figures again followed the decline in consumer confidence. 

Figure 8: Confidence in the economy and trust in cabinet in The Netherlands February 2007-July 2009 (Source: TNS NIPO/RTL Nieuws).


Dramatic events can also explain why trust declines spectacularly and suddenly. In the mid-nineties, in a period of economic austerity, trust in almost all political institutions in Belgium suddenly plummeted after the Dutroux affair and the subsequent White marches. Similarly, it can be argued that in The Netherlands, the assassination of the populist politician Fortuyn in May 2002 and the subsequent political turmoil can explain why trust levels decreased so sharply between late 2001 and late 2003, as compared to the rest of the EU. 


5. The Dynamics of Trust: Short-term Fluctuations and Long-term Stability

In brief, political trust in the Netherlands has been wavering, but has not withered away. The trust figures have fluctuated for a number of political institutions, but there are no indications for a structural, long-term decline. Political opinion has become more volatile, and this explains why political trust is in flux. The evolution of a more volatile form of trust is the result of a better-educated, better-informed cohort of politically astute citizens that is more apt to use critical criteria when asked to evaluate government or political institutions. Citizens may well be more critical than they once were. But structural changes in the government (supply side) and the media have made it also likely that they have more to be critical about (Hay 2007: 49). The survey answers to the trust-in-government questions are above all affected by the assessment of contemporary political and economic circumstances (Cook & Gronke 2005: 799). 

Political trust is generally perceived as the cement of democracy. The generally held  view that the smooth functioning of political systems depends on trust has caused much concern about how much people trust government and why trust levels have dropped. But how worrisome are the current trends in government disenchantment and trust across a broad range of established democracies?

Firstly, the empirical evidence supporting the idea that political trust and satisfaction with democracy has steadily eroded in liberal democracies, is by no means clear-cut. Some of the claims that trust is now in decline, and we are therefore worse off, are not supported by the data (Cook et al. 2005:  77; Van de Walle et al. 2008). 

Secondly, the role and function that is attached to political trust in the literature appears to be overrated. Political trust has been linked to a democratic culture since Almond and Verba’s (1963) groundbreaking study Civic Culture. But fifty years after this landmark, it is questionable whether high levels of trust in the national government are still indicative for a democratic culture. Polls in which trust in the cabinet or attitudes towards government are measured, are conducted on a weekly--or sometimes even daily—base and have become a political factor. These polls are regarded more and more as sensitive barometers of public opinion that show the shifting in opinions, not only in response to big and exciting events, but also in reaction to ‘normal’ politics (Stimson 2004: 21). Declining trust connotes a public that is not happy with the outcomes of government policy. Does this mean that a lack of trust in government, or fluctuating levels of trust, are bad for democracy? 
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^1	  The conventional prediction is that a loss of support for the regime threatens its stability and diminishes the voluntary compliance of citizens with government policy, whereas the impact of support for authorities is confined to the domain of conventional electoral activity (Muller & Jukam 1977; Citrin & Muste 1999: 468).  
^2	  Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, Continu Onderzoek Burgerperspectieven, Kwartaalbericht 2008/1: 25.
^3	  The Belevingsmonitor figure does not exactly match the SCP figure, which is due to the fact that the SCP survey is conducted once every two years, whereas the monitor had four surveys each year. However, the trends are very comparable.  
^4	   The Eurobarometer's survey item is: ‘I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.’  We have listed the trust figures for the national parliament, the national government (‘regering’ in the Dutch survey), and the national political parties. 
^5	  April data are included. The item on trust in national institutions is not repeated in every single survey.
^6	  The DPES data show a similar pattern. Around the 1998 elections 88% of respondents was (very) satisfied with the way democracy functioned, in 2002 this was a mere 49%, which rose to 71% in 2003 and to 77% with the 2006 elections.
^7	  Van der Brug and Van Praag (2007) arrive at the same conclusion. Frank Hendriks (2006) considered the decline to be more structural in nature.
